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Abstract:
In this paper we explore what happens if the government bears some of
the risk through a profit tax when the risk sharing in the venture capital
market is incomplete due to non-observability of eﬀort and moral hazard. If
the external equity investors can enforce exclusive contracts with the entre-
preneurs, the risk relief through a profit tax will give too much insurance
and too low eﬀort compared with a second best optimal solution. Bond &
Devereux (1995) show that a proportional profit tax would be actuarially
neutral in the absence of moral hazard. In the presence of moral hazard we
demonstrate that the tax may aﬀect the risk shifting through the market,
in which case the premise for the neutrality result will no longer hold. We
also find that in contrast to exclusive risk sharing contracts non-exclusive
contracts may in conjunction with a proportional profit tax lead to too little
provision of eﬀort.
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1 Introduction
Many investment projects, for example within the IT area, are highly risky.
In many cases there is a small probability for the project to succeed, in which
case it is expected to earn a sizeable profit, and a high probability of project
failure. If the project requires specialized equipment and competence, the
investment is not recoverable if the project fails. The intangible nature of
investment in specialized knowledge entails that it cannot be used as collat-
eral for loans. Hence, such investment must mainly be financed by equity,
either in the external equity market by seeking equity finance from outside
equity investors or by resorting to internal equity finance, which is limited
by the entrepreneur´s own resources. Borrowing may be possible if the en-
trepreneur has tangible assets to pledge as collateral, but as to risk exposure
this is similar to internal finance as the entrepreneur in either case bears the
risk.
Thus, the risk market that we consider in this paper is the market for
external equity. It may be diﬃcult or costly for external equity investors
to observe the eﬀort that the entrepreneur invests in his project in order to
make the project succeed. This problem may be aggravated by the fact that
the entrepreneur´s own eﬀort may be vital for a successful result. However,
as eﬀort is costly, financing by outside equity weakens the incentives for
the entrepreneur as the outside equity holders share in the returns due to
extraordinarily high eﬀorts by the entrepreneur and cover part of the losses
due to low eﬀort. Thus, providing risk relief to the entrepreneur gives rise to
moral hazard which increases the probability that the project will fail. This
problem could be overcome if the outside equity investors could deduce the
eﬀort from the outcome of the project. In that case the economic terms for
outside equity could be conditioned on outcome, which would be equivalent
to conditioning on eﬀort. In order to preclude that possibility we therefore
assume that entrepreneurial eﬀort only aﬀects the probability of the outcomes
and not the outcome size.
The present paper will explore to what extent public policy, and in par-
ticular tax policy, will aﬀect risk taking and eﬀort choice by an entrepreneur
in the presence of moral hazard. Of particular interest will be the result-
ing risk allocation when a risk absorbing profit tax interacts with the risk
allocation in the financial market. We demonstrate that if private risk mar-
kets coexist with governmental measures for reallocating risk, implemented
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through a profit tax, this will generally alter the equilibrium compared with
the no tax situation. This result is in contrast to Buchholz and Konrad
(2000) and Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003), who confirm the neutrality of a
non-redistributive proportional tax. The non-neutrality result in our paper
is due to the fact that external equity investors do not fully internalize the
moral hazard cost from increased insurance as part of the cost is borne by
the government through the tax system. Our results also relates to the dis-
cussion on the design of a neutral tax on uncertain profits. As shown by Fane
(1987) and Bond and Devereux (1995), a cash flow tax3 will be neutral also
in the presence of risky profits if the market allocation of risk is unaﬀected
by the cash flow tax. However, when risk markets are incomplete because of
moral hazard, entrepreneurs have to bear some idiosyncratic risk that would
otherwise be washed away in complete risk markets.
There is a related literature on the eﬀects from moral hazard in the insur-
ance market with contributions by a.o. Stiglitz (1983), Arnott and Stiglitz
(1988) and (1991a, b), Kaplow (1991), Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) and
Bisin & Guaitoli (2000). Except for Kaplow (1991) these papers do not
address explicitly the interaction between market and public provision of in-
surance. Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) show in a setting with non-exclusive
contracts between the entrepreneur and the external investor that a profit
tax would only crowd out risk relief from the private market. We argue that
a proportional profit tax might alter the equilibrium risk allocation compared
with the no tax situation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we use a simple model
to discuss an entrepreneur’s optimal supply of eﬀort in a situation with a
private risk market and without taxation. In Section 3 we assume that the
financial investors can enforce exclusive risk-sharing contracts. We establish
the central result that risk shifting through the tax system in conjunction
with a private risk market will lead to too much insurance and too little
eﬀort. In section 4 we discuss a proportional profit tax in conjunction with
a private risk market with non-exclusive risk sharing contracts. Section 5
discusses some related results in the literature, while Section 6 concludes.
3In our context a profit tax is equivalent to a cash flow tax.
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2 The model
We employ a simple model for discussing these issues. We consider a sector
where there is a large number of entrepreneurs facing identical investment
opportunities with uncertain returns. Thus, we abstract from adverse selec-
tion problems altogether. Each project requires a fixed investment equal to
I. Hence, the investment scale is exogenous so that we concentrate on the
problem of allocating project risk. For simplicity we assume that there are
only two economic outcomes from the investment. One outcome denoted
success, is a state in which the investment generates a net surplus equal to
Π − I. In the other state the investment turns out to be a failure and in
which case the amount invested is lost altogether. The state dependent final
wealth is then given by
W +Π− I, i = s(uccess)
Wi =
W − I, i = f(ailure),
where W > I is initial wealth. The probability of success depends on the
eﬀort that the investor provides in order to make the project succeed. Denot-
ing the amount of eﬀort e, the probability of success is p(e), with p0(e) > 0 and
p00(e) < 0. Thus, we have positive and decreasing marginal returns to eﬀort.
The probabilities are independent across entrepreneurs so that the project
risk is unsystematic. We assume that the sector is suﬃciently large so that
the expected outcome per entrepreneur equals the average outcome. Also,
the analysis is partial in that we only consider the entrepreneurial sector and
disregard interaction with the rest of the economy. As the entrepreneurs are
all identical, we can focus on the situation for a representative entrepreneur.
As the model is timeless there is no discounting.
The entrepreneur is maximizing the expected net utility from the project
with respect to eﬀort. Letting U(Wi) denote the utility of the outcome Wi,
the entrepreneur is maximizing
EU = p(e)U(W +Π− I) + (1− p(e))U(W − I)− V (e),
where we have assumed that the disutility of eﬀort, V (e), is separable.
We further assume U 0(W ) > 0 and U 00(W ) < 0, so that entrepreneurs have
risk aversion, and that the disutility of eﬀort is increasing and convex in e,
V 0(e) > 0 and V 00(e) > 0, and V (0) = 0. As to the expected utility, the
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indiﬀerence curves will be convex over state dependent outcomes for a given
eﬀort level4.
The first order condition for the entrepreneur’s optimal supply of eﬀort
is given by
p0(e)(Us − Uf) = V 0(e), (1)
where Us and Uf are total utility in states s and f , respectively.
We assume that there exists a financial sector providing risk bearing cap-
ital to the entrepreneurial sector. In order to fix ideas we may think of
financial equity investment as venture capital5. That means that agents in
the financial sector invest equity capital in the entrepreneurial sector. We
abstract from borrowing so that the external equity is replacing part of the
entrepreneur’s equity in the project. External equity investors will have a
claim to a share of the net surplus in the successful state. On the other hand
the external equity investment will be totally lost if the project fails. Hence,
the external equity investment will reduce the loss for the entrepreneur by the
same amount so that external equity investors will bear some of the project
risk. Financial investors are assumed to be risk neutral, possibly because
they have perfectly diversified portfolios. Hence, they will maximize the ex-
pected return on their portfolios. As the model is static we may disregard
opportunity costs of financial equity investment.
4There is however a complication arising from the fact that the incentives for provid-
ing eﬀort depend on the diﬀerence between the expected utility in the two states, and
the indiﬀerence curves corresponding to an optimized level of eﬀort need not be convex.
The reason for this is that the marginal rate of substitution between final wealth in the
successful and unsuccessful state will depend on the probability of succeeding which is
increasing in eﬀort. If not explicitly stated otherwise, we disregard for the present analy-
sis non-convexity problems and assume that at the optimum the indiﬀerence curves are
locally convex.
5In some settings a venture capitalist not only supplies equity finance but also provides
valuable business advice. In our paper this is not the case and the venture capitalist may
be seen as a financial intermediary.
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3 Exclusive private risk sharing contracts
3.1 Introduction
In this section we assume that the financial investors can enforce exclusive
risk sharing contracts. An exclusive risk sharing contract is defined as a con-
tract where the financial investor can control the entrepreneur’s total risk
relief through the external risk market. This presupposes that each entrepre-
neur enters into a risk sharing contract with only one financial investor. We
let E denote the amount of external equity investment in each project and
π the profits accruing to external stake holders, i.e., the amount net of the
equity investment accruing to the financial investor in the successful state.
It may be natural to assume that the share of the net surplus accruing to
the external equity holder is given by the share of external equity to total
equity. We shall, however, allow for the possibility that π and E are de-
termined independently subject to the constraint that the external financial
equity investment at least breaks even.
The expected profit for external investors is then given by
R(π,E) = p(e)π − (1− p(e))E, (2)
where π/E is the rate of return in the successful state on the external
equity investment.
The state dependent final wealth for the entrepreneur is then given by
W +Π− I − π, i = s(uccess)
Wi =
W − I +E, i = f(ailure).
The financial investor will choose π and E in order to maximize expected
profits subject to the constraint that the entrepreneur at least obtains his
reservation utility. The solution can however be characterized more conve-
niently by assuming that the optimal choice of financial contract maximizes
the expected utility of the entrepreneur subject to a constraint on expected
profit for the financial investor. As we have abstracted from financial op-
portunity costs we assume that the expected returns on the external equity
investment must be non-negative.
Exclusivity means that the external equity investors can fully control the
total amount of external equity capital in each project. Hence, the investor
can figure out the incentive eﬀects of the financial contract from condition (1).
Therefore, the financial investor may as well be thought of as choosing the
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eﬀort level subject to the incentive constraint (1) governing the entrepreneur’s
choice of eﬀort.
3.2 Observability of eﬀort
As a point of reference we first assume that entrepreneurial eﬀort can be
observed by the financial investors. In that case the optimum eﬀort level can
be enforced as part of the financial contract. The optimal contract is then
determined by
MaxEu
(π,E,e)
= p(e)U(W +Π− I − π) + (1− p(e))U(W − I +E)− V (e)
subject to,
p(e)π − (1− p(e))E = 0
The first order condition for optimal risk sharing implies
U 0s = U
0
f = λ (3)
where λ is the shadow price of the zero profit constraint which will be
equal to the marginal utility of certain income. With state independent
utilities condition (3) implies equal total utilities in the two states. Hence,
Ws =Wf so that the optimal contract gives the entrepreneurs full insurance
against failure. Hence, Π− π = E so that π +E = Π6 .
The first order condition for optimal eﬀort is
p0(e)(Us − Uf) + λ[p0(e)π + p0(e)E]− V 0(e) = 0. (4)
For later reference it will be useful to rewrite the first order condition for
optimal eﬀort (4) as
p0(e)(Us − Uf)
λ
+ p0(e)(π +E) =
V 0(e)
λ
(5)
The first term on the left hand side of (5) is the expected gain in monetary
terms accruing to the entrepreneur as a result of increased eﬀort. The second
6In this context full insurance must be interpreted as a situation where the financial
investor takes over the project and hires the entrepreneur at a fixed wage.
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term is the increase in the expected profit on the financial contract from
increased eﬀort as π + E is the total value at risk for the external investor.
A first best contract implies full insurance for the entrepreneur. In that case
the entrepreneur does not gain from increased eﬀort, so that one is only
left with the expected gain accruing to the financial investor. With full risk
shifting the value at risk in the financial contract equals the total value at
risk, i.e., π+E = Π. Hence the total social gain from increased eﬀort is fully
internalized by the financial market, and the eﬀort level determined by the
financial external investors is the first best level as given by condition (5).
3.3 Unobservability of eﬀort
We now turn to the case where the entrepreneurial eﬀort is not observable
by the external investors. They must however take into account the fact that
the risk sharing contract will aﬀect the eﬀort incentives for the entrepreneur.
Even though the external investors cannot observe eﬀort directly, they can
figure out how the degree of risk relief through the risk sharing contract
aﬀects the optimum supply of eﬀort determined by condition (1). Hence,
the external investors can be seen as indirectly choosing entrepreneurial ef-
fort subject to (1). The optimal contract can then be characterized by the
following optimization problem:
MaxEU
(π,E,e)
= p(e)U(W +Π− I − π) + (1− p(e))U(W − I +E)− V (e)
subject to
p(e)π − (1− p(e))E = 0 (λ)
p0(e)(Us − Uf)− V 0(e) = 0 (μ).
This yields the first order conditions
(wrt.π)
−p(e)U 0s + λp(e)− μp0(e)U 0s = 0 (6)
(wrt.E)
(1− p(e))U 0f − λ(1− p(e))− μp0(e)U 0f = 0 (7)
(wrt.e)
p0(e)(Us−Uf) +λp0(e)(π+E) +μ(p00(e)(Us−Uf)−V 00(e))− V 0(e) = 0 (8)
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Conditions (6) and (7) characterize the optimum risk sharing, and con-
dition (8) characterizes the optimum eﬀort level. From (6) and (7) we have
U 0f
∙
1− μp
0(e)
1− p(e)
¸
= λ = U 0s
∙
1 +
μp0(e)
p(e)
¸
(9)
It is easy to show that μ must be positive when the incentive constraint is
binding7. Assuming μ < 0 implies U 0f < U
0
s. That implies Wf > Ws in which
case the incentive constraint (1) cannot hold. Hence, μ must be positive.
Then, when the incentive constraint is binding, Wf < Ws and Π − π > E
so that the risk shifting oﬀered by the optimal contract will be less than
complete, which reflects the moral hazard cost from the dilution of the eﬀort
incentives. Hence, the value at risk in the financial market will be less than
the total value at risk as Π > π + E so that the financial investors will not
internalize fully the total gains from increased eﬀort. Moreover, π+E > 0 by
(8). Then, by the zero profit constraint, E > 0 so that in a situation with risk
averse entrepreneurs and risk neutral financial investors the eﬃcient solution
will involve some risk shifting through external equity investments, but the
entrepreneur will have to bear some risk due to the presence of moral hazard8.
Condition (8) can be rewritten as
p0(e)(Us − Uf)
λ
+ p0(e)(π +E) =
V 0(e)
λ
− μ
λ
(p00(e)(Us − Uf)− V 00(e)) (10)
The terms on the left hand side of (10) are the gains from increased
entrepreneurial eﬀort accruing to the entrepreneur and the external financial
investors respectively. The first term on the right hand side is marginal eﬀort
cost and the second term represents marginal moral hazard cost due to the
fact that increasing the incentives for eﬀort means that more of the risk has
to be born by the entrepreneur. When the level of eﬀort is privately optimal
in the sense of condition (1), the expected marginal gain to the entrepreneur
equals marginal eﬀort cost. Hence, the condition for optimal eﬀort simplifies
to
p0(e)(π +E) = −μ
λ
(p00(e)(Us − Uf)− V 00(e)) (11)
7If μ = 0, then the constraint is not binding, U 0f = U , and the entrepreneur bears no
risk.
8This is a well known property of optimal insurance with moral hazard, see Shavell
(1979).
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Thus, the second best optimal eﬀort is characterized by the expected gain
to the external financial investors from increased eﬀort being equal to moral
hazard cost, e.g. risk shifting through the profit tax.
Risk shifting means redistributing income from good states to bad states.
In the present context this redistribution is constrained by the adverse eﬀect
on the profitability of the external equity investments resulting from the
dilution eﬀect on eﬀort incentives.
3.4 The role of taxes
One might ask whether this risk shifting could have been obtained through
the tax system as well. Risk relief through the tax system would mean
shifting some of the risk from the entrepreneurial sector to the government.
The government will have a stake in all taxable activities. The authorities
are in eﬀect perfectly diversified so that all unsystematic risk will wash out
in the net tax revenue. Hence, expected tax revenue would equal average
revenue. In the present model it is clear that an actuarially neutral profit
tax would provide the same opportunities for redistribution of risk as the
financial market for external equity.
We consider a situation where there is initially a given tax system, and
we then examine how the presence of such a tax aﬀects the risk allocation
at a financial market equilibrium. It is assumed that in the market for
venture capital the financial investors take the tax rates of the profit tax
as given parameters when choosing the optimum financial contract. The
government taxes both the entrepreneurial profit and the profit accruing to
the external investor. The tax system in our model may be seen as a tax on
the net present value of a project. Supra-normal profit is taxed, while profit
lower than normal is deductible9. We assume that any tax revenue from the
profit tax does not aﬀect the utility of the entrepreneurs and the financial
investors.10 Our model is partial also in the fact that we ignore that the tax
9The tax system is a diﬀerential tax system, which taxes the diﬀerential between the
actual profit and a normal rate of return, see Sandmo (1989). For simplicity, the normal
rate of return is set to zero. An external investor will not require a risk premium to invest
in the project.
10Alternatively we could assume that the profit tax may finance a lump sum subsidy.
The financial investors and entrepreneurs would then take the profit tax and the lump
sum subsidy as given parameters when choosing the optimum financial contract. That
could be because they do not see through the government budget.
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might aﬀect prices elsewhere in the economy.
The redistribution of risk through the tax system can in the present model
be implemented by an entrepreneurial tax rate t in the good state and a
corresponding tax rate αt in the bad state, with α ≥ 0. α > 1 means more
than full loss oﬀset in case of failure.
After tax final wealth for the entrepreneur is then
W + (Π− I − π)(1− t), i = s
Wi =
W − (I −E)(1− αt), i = f .
We may note that government risk relief would not improve on the market
allocation of project risk provided the government is subject to the same
informational constraint as the financial market, see Kaplow (1991). In that
sense the risk allocation in the financial market equilibrium will be second
best optimal.11
With private information with respect to eﬀort, the Pareto optimal risk
sharing contract would oﬀer less than full insurance and is given by the first
order condition for the following optimization problem:
Max
(π,E,e)
EU = p(e)U(W+(Π−I−π)(1−t))+(1−p(e))U(W−(I−E)(1−αt))−V (e)
subject to
((1− t)p(e)π − (1− αt)(1− p(e))E) = 0
p0(e)(Us − Uf)− V 0(e) = 0.
Pareto optimal risk sharing is given by
U 0f
∙
1− μp
0(e)
1− p(e)
¸
= λ = U 0s
∙
1 +
μp0(e)
p(e)
¸
(12)
For given eﬀort the first order condition for the optimal risk relief is the
same as in the no tax case and given as in (9), confirming that the optimal risk
relief will imply partial risk coverage. However, in determining the socially
optimal eﬀort level it must be taken into account that the supply of eﬀort
11However, even though the government cannot observe eﬀort, it has the right to tax
and it can stimulate entrepreneurial eﬀort indirectly by taxing substitutes and subsidiz-
ing complementary activities to entrepreneurial eﬀort. This argument is however valid
regardless of whether or not there is a private market for reallocating risk.
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has to be privately optimal, given the insurance embodied in the risk sharing
contracts.
3.5 Graphical illustration of the second best optimum
To gain some more insight into how a profit tax distorts the allocation of risk
in the market for risk bearing capital, we illustrate the problem graphically.
The supply side of venture capital is characterized by feasible combinations
of π and E such that R(π,E) = p(e)π − (1− p(e))E = 0. In a competitive
financial market financial portfolios will break even in equilibrium. Hence
R(π,E) = 0. When deriving the zero profit frontier of the supply set it must
be taken into account that the eﬀort level will be a function of the terms of
risk coverage as given by π and E. From (1) we have in the no tax situation
that
∂e
∂E
=
p0(e)U 0f
p00(e)(Us − Uf)− V 00(e)
< 0
and
∂e
∂π
=
p0(e)U 0s
p00(e)(Us − Uf)− V 00(e)
< 0
such that eﬀort decreases with both the amount of external equity which
bears part of the risk in the unsuccessful state, and with the surplus that
goes to the external equity holders, which reduces the entrepreneurial profit
in the successful state. Hence, eﬀort decreases along any positively sloped
line in the (π,E)-plane.
Along the zero profit frontier πmust be some function ofE asE aﬀects the
privately optimal eﬀort and hence the probability of success. We let π = π(E)
denote this relationship. Hence, p(e) = p(e(π,E)) = p(e(π(E), E)) ≡ p(E)
which is assumed to be locally monotone. Thus, along the zero profit frontier
the supply of external equity determines the eﬀort level and the success
probability. Along R(π,E) = 0 and we then have π(E) = E 1−p(E)p(E) .
The slope of the zero profit frontier is given by12
∂π
∂E
=
1− p(E)
p(E)
− E
(p(E))2
∂p(E)
∂E
. (13)
12This approach parallels Stiglitz (1983).
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Equation (13) may be thought of as the slope of the transformation curve
in the financial market for transferring income from the good to the bad state.
The transformation curve is an increasing function of E with slope larger than
(1−p(E))/p(E) since ∂p/∂E < 0. It will, however, not necessarily be convex
everywhere.
For the entrepreneur the marginal rate of substitution between π and E
is given by
dπ
dE
|EU=given=
(1− p(e))U 0f
p(e)U 0s
so that for given eﬀort, indiﬀerence curves in the (π,E)-plane will be
concave13 with positive slope. However, since E aﬀects eﬀort, the indiﬀerence
curve may have convex parts. Assuming that the second best optimum can be
characterized by a tangential solution it is given by equating the marginal rate
of transformation on the supply side with the marginal rate of substitution
on the demand side:
(1− p(e))U 0f
p(e)U 0s
=
1− p(e)
p(e)
− p
0(e)
(p(e))2
∂p(E)
∂E
. (14)
This is illustrated in figure 1.
13The indiﬀerence curves for given eﬀort are concave because the second derivative is
negative;
d2π
dE2
|EU=given= −
(1− p(e))U 00f
p(e)U 00s
< 0.
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Figure 1: Second best optimum with exclusive contracts
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The line F−F 0given by π+E = Π, implies thatWs =Wf , and represents
combinations of π andE yielding full risk coverage for the entrepreneur, while
R(π,E) = 0 is the zero profit frontier. Any combination of π and E above
the F −F 0-line implies minimum eﬀort so that the zero profit frontier above
the F − F 0 line must be a straight line with slope given by the probabilities
corresponding to minimum eﬀort, (1−p(e0))/p(e0), where e0 is minimal eﬀort.
The optimum is at point P ∗, where the indiﬀerence curve is tangential to the
zero profit frontier.
The slope of the ray through P ∗ determines the average price of risk
coverage as it shows how much the entrepreneur has to sacrifice of the surplus
in the successful state per unit of external equity. This is given by (1 −
p(e∗))/p(e∗) where e∗ is optimal eﬀort at P ∗. Thus we see that the average
price for external equity is less than the marginal price. The reason for this
is of course that eﬀort is decreasing as one moves upwards the zero profit
frontier. We may note that if the entrepreneur can obtain additional equity
finance from other sources at this average cost of coverage, P ∗ would not
represent a privately optimal risk coverage for the entrepreneur. The optimal
risk coverage would then be where an indiﬀerence curve is tangential to the
average price line.
3.6 Taxes and optimal eﬀort provision
To examine how the tax eﬀects the optimal eﬀort provision, we diﬀerentiate
condition (1) for optimum eﬀort with respect to the tax rate. We have
∂e
∂t
= −
−p0(e)U 0s(Π− I − π) + p0(e)U 0fα(−I +E)
p00(e)(Us − Uf)− V 00(e)
< 0, (15)
since Π− I − π > 0 and −I +E < 0 with partial risk sharing. Hence, as
long as t < 1, increasing the tax rate leads to lower eﬀort. Notice that this
result is independent of α as long as α ≥ 0.
The profit tax may be compared with an insurance contract as illustrated
in Figure 2. With taxation, the combined risk shifting by the profit tax
in conjunction with the supply of external equity is given by the points
(π + (Π− I − π)t, E + (I −E)αt) in the (π, E) - plane. The full insurance
line is now given by π+(Π−I−π)t+E+(I−E)αt = Π, where Π is the same
as in the no-tax case. Note that zero private insurance now corresponds to
the point ((Π− I)t, Iαt).
14
Redistribution of risk through the financial market could alternatively be
implemented through a non-linear profit tax such that p(e)t(Π − I) − (1 −
p(e))αtI ≡ p(e)gs− (1−p(e))gf = 0, where gs and −gf are the government’s
stake in the good and bad state, respectively. The parameters gs and −gf
could be set equal to π and E in the no tax case. The tax rates would then
have to satisfy αt/t = p(e)(Π− I)/(1−p(e))I so that αt ≥ t14. A risk averse
entrepreneur needs higher expected profit in the good state than in the bad
state to invest in the project. Thus, if the tax system should replicate the
risk relief through the financial market, α ≥ 1. In the specific case where the
government bears all risk, the tax rates would be equal, αt = t, or α = 1.
Then there is no moral hazard because the entrepreneur bears no risk and
provides minimum eﬀort.
In the following we discuss three diﬀerent tax schedules, diﬀering only
with respect to the actual notion of actuarial neutrality. The first two sched-
ules allow for more than full loss oﬀset, i.e. α > 1. One of them is actuarially
neutral in the absence of an external equity market, while the other oﬀers
risk relief at the same implicit average price as an external equity investor
would do in a no tax situation. The third tax schedule is a proportional tax
system (α = 1), which is actuarially neutral in the absence of moral hazard,
see Bond & Devereux (1995).
In Figure 2 we illustrate an actuarially neutral profit tax absent an exter-
nal equity market. Thus, the risk sharing mechanism through the profit tax
has to lie on the zero profit frontier for an external equity investor in the no-
tax case. The profit tax is represented by the point on the zero profit frontier
in the no tax case. The zero profit frontier for an external investor, given the
tax system, must be located to the right of the zero profit curve in the no
tax case, as illustrated in the figure. The reason for this is that the external
investor will not internalize the government’s increased moral hazard cost,
due to the entrepreneur’s increased total risk relief. The optimal risk sharing
is now given by P ∗∗, rather than P ∗ in the no tax case. P ∗∗ is the second best
optimum in the tax situation in the sense that it is not possible to increase
the expected utility for the entrepreneur without violating the zero profit
constraint for the external equity investor. The average cost of risk coverage
from an external investor is higher15, which reflects the fact that the after
14If investment expenditures were fully tax deductible the government would absorb all
the risk through the tax system if the tax rates satisfy (αt− t)I = (1− t)Π.
15This can be seen in the figure because the line for average cost of risk coverage from
an external investor is steeper in the tax case.
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tax solution involves less eﬀort and a higher probability of project failure.
Figure 2 is consistent with equation (15) for the special case where α > 1.
Risk shifting through the tax system in conjunction with a private risk market
leads to too much insurance and too little eﬀort. The ineﬃciency is due to the
fact that external equity investors do not fully internalize the moral hazard
cost from increased insurance as part of the cost is borne by the government
through the tax system. This is a special case of a common agency problem
discussed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), as the entrepreneur may be
thought of as having two principals, namely, the financial investor and the
government, which in this case do not coordinate their insurance policies.
However, in our model the problem is sequential in that the government
decides the tax policy before the entrepreneur obtains equity finance from an
external investor.
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Figure 2: Actuarially neutral profit tax absent an external equity market
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In Figure 3 we illustrate a profit tax that provides risk relief at an implicit
average price of risk coverage, which equals that of an optimal exclusive
contract between the entrepreneur and an external equity investor in the no
tax situation. This tax system is illustrated by the point on the average price
line for this exclusive contract in the figure. The optimal risk sharing contract
is now P ∗∗, rather than P ∗ in the no-tax case. Since the government’s risk
relief is at the same implicit average price as the external investor, we should
perhaps expect that the tax would only crowd out risk relief provided by the
external investor. However, this is not the case. Risk shifting through the tax
system in conjunction with a private risk market will also in this case lead to
too much insurance and too little eﬀort. This will also be the case even if the
government designs a tax system which exactly mimics the optimal contract
between the entrepreneur and the equity investor in the no-tax case. This
is due to the sequential structure of our model. The external investor will
provide an additional contract which does not internalize the increased moral
hazard cost of the government.
Figure 3 illustrates another special case of condition (15) when α > 1. We
see from both Figure 2 and Figure 3 that the utility level of the entrepreneur
is increased. This is so because the financial investor always breaks even
in our model. The government would not break even however because of
the additional moral hazard costs. Hence, the government bears the moral
hazard cost due to overinsurance.
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In Figure 4 we illustrate the profit tax as a risk sharing device at the
same implicit price as in a private competitive insurance contract, where the
eﬀort level is zero and α = 1. If the eﬀort level is zero, the external investor
owns the whole company. Because of the zero profit constraint for a risk
neutral external investor the expected profit in the good state has to equal
expected profit in the bad state. To mimic the private competitive insurance
contract the government’s expected tax revenue in the good state has to
equal expected tax revenue in the bad state. Thus, α = 1.
The entrepreneur is risk averse and requires a risk premium to bear some
of the idiosyncratic risk in the risk sharing equilibrium. The profit tax reduces
this risk premium. The zero profit frontier in the (π, E) - plane must be
located to the left of the zero profit curve in the no-tax case, as illustrated
in the figure. The utility level of the entrepreneur decreases in the tax case
compared to the no-tax case. In the figure the average price of private risk
sharing is higher16 and the entrepreneur’s eﬀort level is lower in equilibrium
in the tax case. In the exclusive contract case the proportional profit tax will
distort the second best allocation of risk in an economy where markets for
risk shifting are constrained by the presence of moral hazard. In conjunction
with the insurance provided by the financial market and short of complete
risk coverage, the proportional profit tax will shift income from the good to
the bad state at a higher average implicit price than the financial market.
This will lower the entrepreneur’s utility level and will lead to too much risk
relief and too little eﬀort from an eﬃciency point of view.
A proportional profit tax, which is actuarially neutral in the absence of
moral hazard, see Bond and Devereux (1995), will distort the second best
optimum allocation of risk when moral hazard is present. This result is
consistent with condition (15) and will lead to too much risk relief and too
little eﬀort from an eﬃciency point of view.
16The slope of the average price line is higher in the tax case.
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4 Non-exclusive risk sharing contracts
To the extent that a profit tax acts as a risk sharing device shifting risk
from entrepreneurs to the tax payers, the presence of a private market for
risk bearing capital in conjunction with the tax eﬀectively means that the
exclusivity of the risk sharing relation between the firm and the government
cannot be enforced. Thus, as shown in the exclusive contract case, even if
the risk sharing through the tax were actually optimal in the first place, i.
e. equal to the optimal private contract in the no tax case, a private equity
investor would still find it profitable to provide additional risk relief for the
entrepreneur as he would only consider the risk pertaining to the after tax
profit and disregard the moral hazard costs that fall on the government.
Similarly, if external equity investors could not enforce exclusive contracts,
the moral hazard costs of the new contract that fall on the previous equity
investor are not taken into account when recontracting and will therefore be
in the nature of external costs. If the total amount of external equity finance
cannot be observed, the possibility of providing supplementary risk relief
would tend to lower eﬀort incentives. The general problem is that an optimal
contract between two parties is eroded by the possibility of recontracting by
a third party, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
Kahn & Mookherjee (1998) and Bisin & Guaitoli (2000) discuss moral
hazard and non-exclusive contacts in a discrete eﬀort model, while Arnott &
Stiglitz (1991b) use a continuous model17. Kahn & Mookherjee show that
if an equilibrium is defined as a state where no profitable supplementary
contract exists regardless of the choice of eﬀort, then rationing risk bearing
capital might be enforceable even in a situation with non-exclusive contracts.
Following Kahn & Mookherjee (1998) we demonstrate by means of a
simple example the interaction between publicly provided risk relief in con-
junction with a private market based on this notion of equilibrium. We
assume that entrepreneurial eﬀort can be either low or high. The entrepre-
neur’s choice of eﬀort level depends on how much there is to be gained by
increasing the probability of success. The greater the risk relief, the smaller
the incentive for choosing high eﬀort. The indiﬀerence curves showing the
trade oﬀ between wealth in the success and failure states corresponding to
the reduced form utility function being maximized with respect to eﬀort, will
17There may be a problem with non-existence in a model with continuous eﬀort. Here
we only discuss the two eﬀort case.
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typically be non-convex.
The FF’line represents full insurance for the entrepreneur and in the area
close to this line the entrepreneur will choose low eﬀort. The marginal rate of
substitution between wealth in the failure and success state will be less when
eﬀort is low compared to when it is high. The reason for this is that high
eﬀort is maximizing the probability of the more favorable outcome. Hence,
where the indiﬀerence curves cross, the entrepreneur will switch from high
to low eﬀort. The reduced form indiﬀerence curve when eﬀort is optimized,
will therefore have a kink where eﬀort switches from high to low. Connecting
the switching points gives the borderline SS’ where eﬀort is low above this
line and high in the area below. In the case of exclusivity the equilibrium
risk sharing contract would be one of two types. One possibility would be
maximum insurance compatible with high eﬀort, i. e., on the SS’ line. The
other possibility would be full insurance and minimum eﬀort, i. e., on the
FF’ line.
In the non-exclusive case the equilibrium is a third best allocation and
can take either of two forms in the two eﬀort case. One possibility is full
insurance and minimum eﬀort, i.e., on the FF’ line. The other possibility
is a third best equilibrium compatible with high eﬀort. The latter case is
illustrated in Figure 5 for the no tax case at point E. Kahn & Mookherjee
(1998) define the third best equilibrium as an equilibrium which is immune
to supplementary risk shifting contracts. In the two eﬀort case the high
eﬀort equilibrium will be immune to a risk sharing contract at a low eﬀort
equilibrium price. We see that the equilibrium at point E in Figure 5 is a
third best equilibrium with high eﬀort because this equilibrium is immune
to a risk sharing contract at a low eﬀort equilibrium price. The equilibrium
at point E is also immune to an additional risk sharing contract at a high
eﬀort equilibrium price. If the investors provide higher risk relief than point
E, the entrepreneur would prefer an additional risk sharing contract at a low
eﬀort equilibrium price. For proof, see Kahn & Mookherjee. A second best
equilibrium would be on the borderline for shift of eﬀort, SS’. We see from
Figure 5 that the third best equilibrium at point E would give less risk relief
than a second best equilibrium on the SS’ line.
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A proportional profit tax may alter the equilibrium. This is illustrated
in Figure 6. The proportional profit tax has to lie on the price line of risk
coverage with low eﬀort. Thus, the government provides tax relief at a higher
price than the external investor in the high eﬀort case. The entrepreneur’s
utility from providing high eﬀort will be reduced. Thus, the entrepreneur has
to own a larger share of the company to elicit high eﬀort. The tax will reduce
the entrepreneur’s utility level and may reduce the total risk relief for the
entrepreneur from E to E*. If tax rates are suﬃciently high, the tax may
shift the equilibrium to a low eﬀort and full insurance equilibrium, in which
case there exists no third best equilibrium with high eﬀort. A proportional
profit tax will not be neutral with respect to risk exposure in a risk market
where external equity investors cannot enforce exclusive contracts. It is also
interesting to note that while a proportional profit tax may lead to too much
risk relief with exclusive risk sharing contracts, the result may be the opposite
with non-exclusive contracts. This is due to the fact that the entrepreneur’s
owner share of the company has to be increased to ensure that an additional
risk sharing contract would not be profitable for the entrepreneur.
4.1 Discussion of the results
In our settings we have shown that a proportional profit tax will not satisfy
the criteria for a neutral tax in the presence of moral hazard. This is in con-
trast to Buchholz and Konrad (2000) and Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003),
who in a model with two eﬀort levels find that a non-redistributive profit
tax will be neutral. The analysis of Buchholz and Konrad is within a par-
tial equilibrium model, while Keuschnigg and Nielsen extend and strengthen
their result by showing that it also holds in a general equilibrium context.
Keuschnigg and Nielsen assume that the tax revenue from workers and en-
trepreneurs is refunded to the same population group. They assume that
the government sets the fiscal policy before the external investor proposes
a financial contract to the entrepreneur. They then show that the external
investors, having found an optimal risk sharing solution in the first place,
will simply undo the extra insurance provided by the government. They
prove that it is always possible to replicate the initial situation before taxes.
In their proof they implicitly assume that the optimal private risk sharing
contract is replication of the initial situation before taxes. This may however
not be true. The entrepreneur may have incentives to behave opportunisti-
25
π+(Π –I- π)t
E+(I-E)αt
Π
Π
F
F’
S
S’
Price of risk coverage 
with low effort
Price of risk coverage 
with high effort
E
E*
Full risk coverage line
Borderline for 
shift of effort Indifference 
curves
Figure 6:
26
cally as a "free rider" and try to increase his utility. If he is shirking and the
other entrepreneurs are not, he will only reduce his lump sum transfer with
TE/nE, where nE is the number of entrepreneurs in the model and TE is the
lump sum transfer. In their model they assume that the entrepreneur will
lose the whole lump sum transfer TE if he is shirking.
In our setting we assume that the tax revenue from the profit tax does not
aﬀect the entrepreneurs and the financial investors. Our model is also partial,
in that we ignore that the tax might aﬀect prices elsewhere in the economy.
As we have seen from Figure 3, even if the risk-sharing through the tax were
actually mimicking the private risk-sharing in the no-tax situation, a private
equity investor would find it profitable to provide additional risk-sharing as
he would ignore the moral hazard costs that fall on the government. Only if
the private equity investor and the government coordinate their risk bearing,
would they replicate the initial situation before taxes.
The proportional profit tax in our model may be compared with a pro-
gressive tax in Keushnigg and Nielsen (2003). In their setting a progressive
tax is defined as a redistributive tax, where some part of the tax revenue is
distributed to a diﬀerent group of the population. Our proportional profit
tax may be seen as a tax where all the tax revenue is given to another sector
of the economy. They find that the redistributive tax reduces the optimal
total risk relief for the entrepreneur. Our model gives the opposite results as
it is privately optimal to increase the total risk relief since the government
bears part of the increased moral hazard costs.
The results of this paper are not aﬀected by the presence of financial
opportunity costs to the extent that they are fully tax deductible. They do
however depend on how the opportunity costs of eﬀort are modelled. In our
paper opportunity costs are not included in the tax base, implying that these
costs are not tax-deductible, possible because they are not observable. If the
entrepreneur chooses between providing eﬀort in his own firm or employment
in another firm, the opportunity cost of eﬀort is normally taxed. In that case
of deductibility (15) would change to:
∂e
∂t
= −
−p0(e)U 0s(Π− I − π) + p0(e)U 0fα(−I +E) + ∂
2V
∂e∂te(1− t) + V 0
p00(e)(Us − Uf)− V 000(1− t)2
.
(16)
Then it is no longer clear that a small increase in the tax rate will, cet.
par., have a negative eﬀect on the provision of eﬀort.
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In related models on tax policy and venture capital the results of Keuschnigg
and Nielsen (2000, 2002) diﬀer from ours. In Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2000)
the opportunity cost of eﬀort is taxed, and postulating constant relative risk
aversion utility function they find no welfare eﬀect from a common tax rate
for a wage and capital income tax in a situation where the incentive com-
patibility constraint ensures that the entrepreneur provides high eﬀort. This
result depends on the constant relative risk aversion utility function combined
with a comprehensive tax on income due to alternative use of eﬀort and the
assumption that the entrepreneur has no funds of his own. When alternative
uses of eﬀort are taxed equally along with profits, the tax reduces the entre-
preneur’s risky profits and his opportunity cost of eﬀort equi-proportionally.
Then, given the particular utility function and the assumption of no own
funds, the tax is neutral.
In Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002) the opportunity cost of eﬀort is treated
as an extra unobserved private benefit. This is equivalent to the treatment
of eﬀort in Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003) and in our model. Thus, the tax
system could mimic the contract in the private financial market and given
the assumption that the external investor and the entrepreneur will prefer to
replicate the initial situation before taxes, the tax system would be neutral.
A natural definition of a non-exclusive contracts equilibrium is one that is
immune to recontracting. In such a setting Kahn & Mookherjee (1998) argue
that in the two eﬀort level case the tax system will be crowding out private
provision of risk relief exactly. However, this hinges on the assumption that
the government provides risk relief to the entrepreneur at the same implicit
price as the external equity investor does. In our model a proportional profit
tax will absorb risk at a higher implicit price than risk sharing through an
external investor in the high-eﬀort case. Then the presence of a proportional
profit tax may alter the equilibrium since it is aﬀecting private incentives.
When risk markets are incomplete because of moral hazard, the entrepreneurs
will have to bear some idiosyncratic risk that would otherwise be washed away
in complete risk markets. Thus the tax system will no longer be neutral with
respect to equilibrium risk exposure.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes a risk market, which is incomplete because of moral
hazard. If private risk markets coexist with governmental measures for real-
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locating risk, implemented through a profit tax, this will generally alter the
equilibrium compared with the no-tax situation. If the external equity in-
vestors can enforce exclusive contracts with the entrepreneurs, the risk relief
through a profit tax would lead to too much risk relief and too low eﬀort
compared with a second best optimal solution.
Thus, a proportional profit tax will in our model alter the equilibrium so-
lution and lead to a reduced utility level for the entrepreneur. With exclusive
risk-sharing contracts this may lead to too low eﬀort provision, while with
non-exclusive contracts the results may be the opposite. These results are
in contrast with the results from risk market models without moral hazard.
Bond & Devereux (1995) rely on the Value Additivity Principle to ensure the
neutrality of a business tax. In our model with moral hazard the celebrated
Value Additivity Principle does not apply.
This paper discusses three types of equilibria. In the first best equilib-
rium we assume that entrepreneurial eﬀort can be observed by the financial
investors. In that case the optimum eﬀort level can be enforced as part
of the financial contract and recontracting is uninteresting. In the second
best equilibrium we assume that the entrepreneurial eﬀort is non-observable.
However, we further assume that the financial investors can enforce exclu-
sive risk sharing contracts. Thus, recontracting is prohibited. In the third
best equilibrium we assume that the total amount of external equity finance
cannot be observed. With non-excludable contracts, recontracting has to be
non-profitable in the third best equilibrium. In all three types of equilibria
the optimal solutions will be immune against recontracting. However, due to
diﬀerent assumptions in the three types of equilibria the entrepreneurs’ opti-
mal risk relief will diﬀer and a proportional profit tax may alter the equilibria
in diﬀerent ways.
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